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SHAPING OUR MENTAL LIVES: 
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MENTAL SELF-REGULATION 
Dorothea Debus 
 
Abstract: The present paper considers our ability to 'shape our own mental lives'; more specifi-
cally, it considers the claim that subjects sometimes can and do engage in 'mental self-regulation', 
that is, that subjects sometimes can be, and are, actively involved with their own mental lives in a 
goal-directed way. This ability of mental self-regulation has been rather neglected by contempo-
rary philosophers of mind, but I show why it deserves careful philosophical attention. In order to 
further our understanding of the nature of the phenomenon of mental self-regulation and to locate 
it within the wider context of our everyday (mental) lives and the world we live in, I proceed to 
develop some conditions which need to be met in order for a subject to be able to engage in men-
tal self-regulation. In developing those conditions we find that compared to the physical realm, 
our mental lives are a rather elusive domain in the face of attempts at intervention, and our ability 
to intervene upon our own mental lives is rather fragile. We also find that our ability to regulate 
our own mental lives in many cases depends on our possession of mental skills and mental know-
how. Both these observations in turn throw new light on our understanding of the nature of the 
human mind. 
 
 
I Ð SETTING THE SCENE 
The topic at the heart of the present paper is our ability to 'shape our own mental lives'. 
Healthy, mature human beings are able to play an active part in how their own mental 
lives develop, and thus, healthy, mature human beings are able to shape their own mental 
lives. This claim might seem surprising, for when we think about what our own mental 
lives are like, it seems that the events which occur in our own mental lives often 'just 
happen' to us: We find ourselves with a thought, or an emotion, or a perceptual experi-
ence, and that's just how things go - that's just what happens in our mental lives. What is 
more, in some cases what happens in our mental lives seems 'inflicted' upon us - for ex-
ample, one might feel overwhelmed by a strong emotion - and in those cases, what is 
happening in our own mental lives seems beyond our control.
1
   
                                                      
1
 Frankfurt (1988) 59f. offers a perceptive description of relevant phenomena, but the focus of his discussion 
lies elsewhere. As far as relevant regulatory activities are concerned, Frankfurt (1988: 68) simply states that their nature 
'is very obscure'. 
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 Clearly, both these observations are accurate, and they indicate that we are often 
passive with respect to our own mental lives. However, we should not lose sight of the 
fact that at other times we also can be, and frequently are, actively involved with respect 
to our mental lives. For example,  
(Emma's Case) when coming home at night, Emma feels a little sad, so she puts on 
some music which she knows will cheer her up. 
As in this particular case, more generally we can be, and often are, actively involved with 
respect to particular events (or particular processes, or particular states of affairs) which 
occur (or obtain) in our own mental lives.
2
 We also can be, and sometimes are, actively 
involved in shaping what might be called our 'mental dispositions', 'mental habits' and 
'mental character traits' (e.g. intellectual virtues and vices). We arguably also can be, and 
sometimes are, actively involved in determining the 'colouring', or the 'tone' of our mental 
lives (as Wittgenstein (1980) RPPI 927 once called it). However, the latter two abilities in 
important ways depend on our ability to be actively involved with relevant particular 
events which occur in our mental lives. I therefore suggest that we here focus on subjects' 
active involvement with respect to particular events which occur in their own mental 
lives. 
 
II Ð THE MENTAL SELF-REGULATION CLAIM 
A subject's active involvement with respect to a particular feature of her own mental life 
is often goal-directed in a specific way: The subject has a view as to how she would like 
the relevant aspect of her own mental life to develop, and her active involvement with the 
relevant feature of her own mental life aims to promote a development towards that goal. 
For example, when Emma feels a little sad and puts on some music which she knows will 
                                                      
2
 In the following, I will often talk of 'events' as shorthand for 'events, processes or states of affairs'. 
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cheer her up, she does this with the goal of feeling more cheerful. We might capture this 
goal-directedness by saying that subjects 'regulate' aspects of their own mental lives. 
Thus,  
(Regulation) when I here say that a subject 'regulates' a certain aspect of her own men-
tal life, I mean to say that the subject is actively involved with that aspect of her own 
mental life in a goal-directed way, and the goal in question concerns the relevant aspect 
of the subject's own mental life. 
Note that, as I use the term here, a subject's being 'actively involved' with an aspect of her 
own mental life does not necessarily require an action on the part of the subject; in the 
present context, someone might also be said to be 'actively involved' with a certain aspect 
of their own mental life if they could act on it in some way, but do not act because the 
relevant aspect of their mental life develops in the way they would like it to anyway.
 Sometimes, a subject might be said to be 'actively involved' with her own mental 
life without that active involvement having a goal concerning an aspect of the subject's 
own mental life: In some cases subjects might be said to be actively involved in their own 
mental lives without having any particular goal at all, and in other cases subjects might be 
said to be actively involved in their own mental lives with a goal which does not concern 
any aspect of their own mental lives. However, such cases do not fall into the remit of our 
present investigation. I am here interested only in cases in which the subject has a rel-
evant goal, and the goal in question concerns an aspect of the subject's own mental life. 
 Subjects can, and do, regulate a wide range of different types of occurrences in 
their mental lives. Amongst other things, subjects sometimes regulate their emotions, 
their thoughts and beliefs, their desires and intentions, their memories, their attention, 
their experiences of pleasure and pain, and their imaginings. Some relevant exemplary 
cases might be sketched as follows:  
- feeling a little sad and putting on some music which one knows will cheer one up;        
- setting out to think about a certain matter more carefully in order to form well-
grounded beliefs on the matter;                   
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- setting out to 'dissolve' and 'get rid of' a desire to stay in and watch TV tonight by 
thinking about going for a swim, expecting that this in turn will produce a desire to go 
for a swim;                      
- setting out to remember where one left one's keys;                 
- repeatedly bringing one's attention back to what someone else is saying in the face of a 
persistent distraction;                     
- engaging in breathing exercises in order to reduce the severity of a current pain ex-
perience;                      
- setting out to imagine a scheduled job interview in a way which one deems to be con-
ducive to doing well in the actual interview; 
The present list of examples, as well as wider everyday (self-)observation, suggest that  
(Mental Self-Regulation Claim) subjects sometimes engage in mental self-regulation; 
that is, subjects sometimes can, and do, regulate (aspects of) their own mental lives. 
More precisely, in light of the exemplary cases just sketched, it seems plausible to hold 
that subjects can, and sometimes do, regulate whether relevant mental events do or do not 
occur in their mental lives - either by bringing it about that a relevant event which has not 
yet occurred does occur, or by letting a relevant event which occurs continue to occur, or 
else by bringing it about that a relevant event ceases to occur; and for those mental events 
which do occur in their mental lives, subjects sometimes also can, and do, regulate which 
properties these mental events have. 
 
III Ð WHY MENTAL SELF-REGULATION MATTERS 
The Mental Self-Regulation Claim should be of interest to philosophers, for the following 
two reasons: 
(i) In order to gain an understanding of the nature of the human mind, we need to 
understand how our mental lives develop across time, and how various factors influence 
that development.                  
(ii) But then, if we are, as the Mental Self-Regulation Claim has it, able to shape our 
mental lives by means of mental self-regulation, this ability is bound to play an impor-
tant part in determining how our mental lives develop.           
(R1) An understanding of the phenomenon of mental self-regulation will therefore be 
crucial for any attempt at gaining a full understanding of the nature of the human 
mind. 
(iii) What is more, if we are able to shape our mental lives by means of mental self-
regulation, we might be able to shape our mental lives for the better, or for the worse. 
(R2) Our ability to shape our own mental lives by means of mental self-regulation 
should therefore also have axiological implications which deserve closer attention; the 
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Mental Self-Regulation Claim gives us good reason to explore issues in what we might 
call 'the ethics of mental life'.  
 These are two good reasons to explore the Mental Self-Regulation Claim further. 
But then, so an interlocutor might observe, we are sometimes also able to regulate the 
mental lives of others;
3
 so why should we here limit our investigation to the phenomenon 
of mental self-regulation?
4
 In response, we might consider a parallel between our present 
topic, the topic of mental self-regulation, and the topic of self-knowledge, which has 
found more intensive attention in recent philosophical debates. It does not seem very sur-
prising that philosophers often consider our ability to gain knowledge about our own 
mental lives independently and separately from our ability to gain knowledge about the 
mental lives of others; for at least at first sight, it seems that we might have some special 
epistemological 'first-person authority' over our own mental lives, a certain authority 
which we have when making judgements about our own mental lives, but which we lack 
when making judgements about the mental lives of others. Quite analogously one might, 
at least at first sight, hold that we have some special agential 'first-person authority' over 
our own mental lives, a certain authority which we have when exerting regulatory control 
over our own mental lives, but which we lack when regulating the mental lives of others.  
 Of course, parts of our account of the phenomenon of mental self-regulation 
might (with the necessary changes) also be fruitfully used in an attempt to account for our 
ability to regulate the mental lives of others; and just as some have argued that self-
knowledge is more similar to knowledge of other minds than one might at first expect, we 
might also find that our ability to engage in mental self-regulation differs less from our 
ability to regulate the mental lives of others than one might at first sight expect. Be this as 
it may, present considerations give us good reason to begin with an exploration of the 
                                                      
3
 For example, realizing that Peter feels a bit sad, Laura tells Peter a joke which she knows will cheer him up, 
Peter starts to giggle a bit, then he laughs, and soon he feels much more cheerful again. 
4
 Thanks to Joseph Raz for raising this question. 
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phenomenon of mental self-regulation, and to postpone a consideration of our ability to 
regulate the mental lives of others.
5
 
 I take it that the Mental Self-Regulation Claim itself is not contentious, so there is 
no need to defend it here; instead, I here aim to develop and explicate the claim in detail.  
 More specifically, therefore, the main question of the present paper is this: 
(Main Question) Given that mental self-regulation is possible, how is it possible (that 
is, what are the 'enabling' conditions which make it possible); and how can the phenom-
enon of mental self-regulation be located within the wider context of our everyday 
lives, and the world we live in? 
In addressing this question we will, or so I hope, come better to understand a phenom-
enon - namely, the phenomenon of mental self-regulation - which has often been ignored 
by contemporary philosophers of mind, but which should, as we have just seen, be of 
central importance in any attempt at understanding the nature of our minds fully. 
 
IV Ð GUIDANCE, INTERVENTION, AND EFFECTIVE AGENCY 
In order for a subject to regulate something, so it seems plausible to hold, it is necessary 
that the subject be able to guide, in a goal-directed way, how the object of her regulatory 
activities develops. For example, in order for a policewoman to regulate the flow of the 
traffic, it is necessary that she be able to guide the flow of the traffic, and that she be able 
to do so in a way that promotes her goal of making the traffic flow smoothly. Analo-
gously, it seems plausible that  
(Guidance Condition) in order for a subject to regulate a certain aspect of her own 
mental life, it is necessary that the subject be able to guide how the relevant aspect of 
her own mental life develops, and that she be able to do so in a goal-directed way. 
                                                      
5
 There are some other interesting links between the topics of self-knowledge and mental self-regulation. 
Greater self-knowledge might improve one's ability to engage in mental self-regulation. However, self-knowledge 
might not always be necessary for mental self-regulation, at least not in those cases in which, as I argue below, mental 
self-regulation depends on the subject's having certain habits and skills. Furthermore, our own mental lives are, as I 
show below, a comparatively elusive domain, our ability to regulate our own mental lives is comparatively fragile, and 
even with a great amount of self-knowledge this will arguably remain so. 
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In order for a subject to be able to guide the development of a certain process in a goal-
directed way, it seems necessary in turn that the subject be able to intervene in the pro-
cess in a goal-directed way. For example, in order for a policewoman to be able to guide 
the flow of the traffic with the goal of making the traffic flow smoothly, it is necessary 
that the policewoman be able to intervene in the flow of the traffic in a way that is condu-
cive to reaching her goal.  
 Accordingly, we have reason to hold that  
(Intervention Condition) in order for a subject to regulate a certain aspect of her own 
mental life, it is necessary that the subject be able to intervene, in a goal-directed way, 
in the unfolding of the relevant aspect of her own mental life. 
Next, we should ask what we are talking about when talking about 'an intervention' here. 
At its most basic, it seems that when we say that a subject 'intervenes' upon a certain 
event, we mean to say that the subject acts in a way which is effective, that is, in a way 
which brings about a change in the targeted event, a change which would not have occur-
red otherwise. Thus, we have reason to accept that in order for someone to intervene 
upon a certain event, it is necessary that the subject act with respect to the relevant event, 
and that she act in a way which is effective, that is, in a way which brings about a change 
in the targeted event, a change which would not have occurred otherwise. This seems true 
for cases of intervention quite generally, and should therefore also be true for cases in 
which a subject intervenes in the unfolding of an aspect of her own mental life. Together 
with the Intervention Condition, it entails that  
(Effective Agency Condition) in order for a subject to regulate a certain aspect of her 
own mental life, it is necessary that the subject be able to act with respect to the relevant 
mental event (or process, or state of affairs), and that she be able to act in a way which 
is effective, that is, in a way which brings about a change in the targeted event (or pro-
cess, or state of affairs), a change which would not have occurred otherwise. 
Taken together, the Guidance Condition, Intervention Condition and Effective Agency 
Condition specify some important enabling conditions for mental self-regulation. Thus, 
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they help us to answer the earlier question as to how mental self-regulation is possible, 
given that it is possible.
6
  
 
V Ð SPECIAL FEATURES - A COMPARISON  
Next, we should try to characterize the actions which subjects engage in when they inter-
vene in the unfolding of their own mental lives in the context of mental self-regulation. In 
order to do so, we might fruitfully compare cases in which subjects intervene on aspects 
of their own mental life with simple, paradigmatic cases of everyday interventions upon 
(purely) physical processes in our own physical environment.
7
  
 We regularly intervene on purely physical processes in our own physical envi-
ronments. For example, we are all familiar with the following simple, paradigmatic cases:  
- catching a ball that would otherwise smash a window;                
- joining in with a group of people who are moving chairs around a room;              
- pushing the pedals of one's bike harder in order to go faster; 
 A comparison of examples of this sort with cases in which subjects intervene on 
aspects of their own mental lives might in turn lead to the following observations: 
 The actions which subjects engage in when they intervene upon (purely) physical 
processes in the physical world in everyday contexts are always physical actions. By con-
trast, the actions which subjects engage in when they intervene upon an aspect of their 
own mental life are sometimes physical actions, but at other times might plausibly be de-
scribed as mental actions.
8
 For example, a subject who asks herself where she left her 
                                                      
6
 When philosophers compile lists of necessary conditions, they sometimes aim ultimately to compile a list of 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, thereby offering a definition, but this is not our goal here. Rather, in deter-
mining some necessary conditions for mental self-regulation I aim to elucidate how our ability to engage in mental self-
regulation is related to, and dependent on, other abilities we have, which should help us to understand the place of men-
tal self-regulation within our wider (mental) lives, which in turn should further our understanding of the phenomenon 
of mental self-regulation itself. (Thanks to Amanda Green for prompting the present comment.) 
7
 In addition to the present comparison it might also be fruitful to compare interventions upon one's own 
mental life with interventions upon one's own body, and with interventions upon the mental lives of others.  
8
 The phenomenon of mental action has long been neglected by philosophers, which, as Wu (2013) 247 aptly 
puts it, is surprising '[g]iven the armchair nature of their work'. However, new philosophical work on the topic has re-
cently been collected by O'Brien and Soteriou (2009), and in Part II of his recent monograph Soteriou (2013) offers a 
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keys intervenes upon an aspect of her own mental life - she tries to bring it about that she 
remembers where she left her keys -, and she does so by means of what might plausibly 
be called a 'mental action', namely asking herself (quietly, 'in her mind' as it were) where 
she left them.  
 Secondly, we find that all actions which subjects engage in when they intervene 
upon (purely) physical processes in the physical world in everyday contexts bring about a 
change in the relevant process in virtue of a causal relation which obtains between the in-
tervening subject's action and the relevant change. By contrast, while the actions which 
subjects engage in when they intervene upon an aspect of their own mental lives some-
times bring about a change in the relevant aspect of the subject's own mental life in virtue 
of a causal relation which obtains between the intervening subject's action and the rel-
evant change, at other times the relation which obtains between the intervening subject's 
action and the relevant change is (also) a reason-giving relation. For example, asking 
oneself to add 44 and 35 gives one reason to think '79'. 
 
VI Ð NOT BOTH DIRECT AND PRECISE  
A third, and I think the most important and most telling difference between interventions 
on physical processes and interventions on one's own mental life is this: The actions 
which subjects engage in when they intervene upon everday (purely) physical processes 
are, in simple, paradigmatic cases, usually both direct and precise; that is, relevant actions 
directly engage with the very physical process upon which the subject wants to intervene, 
and subjects can control the outcome of their actions in a precise manner. By contrast, so 
I would like to suggest, the actions which subjects engage in when they intervene upon 
aspects of their own mental lives when engaged in mental self-regulation are, in simple, 
                                                      
careful consideration of mental action. (Soteriou (2013) ch.9 also offers some interesting considerations as to why the 
phenomenon might have been neglected by philosophers for so long.) 
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paradigmatic cases, and indeed in the great majority of cases, either indirect or imprecise 
(or both), but they are usually not both direct and precise.  
 In order to develop and support the present suggestion, we should first get clear 
about the terminology upon which the suggestion relies. We might clarify our terms as 
follows: 
'Direct' and 'indirect':               
When a subject intervenes upon a particular event (or process, or state of affairs), to say 
that the relevant action on the part of the subject is 'indirect' is to say that the subject 
acts upon the relevant event by acting on another event which in turn has an effect on 
that event which ultimately is the target of the intervention; to say that the subject's ac-
tion is 'direct' is to say that the subject's intervention on the relevant event is not indi-
rect.
9
 
'Precise' and 'imprecise':             
When a subject intervenes upon a particular event (or process, or state of affairs), to say 
that the subject's relevant action is 'precise' is to say that the subject can predict, and can 
control, the changes brought about by her action in a suitably specific way; to say that 
the subject's action is 'imprecise' is to say that the subject cannot predict, and cannot 
control, the changes brought about by her action in a suitably specific way. 
With these terminological stipulations in place, we should give some further consider-
ation to the earlier claim that, in contrast with simple, paradigmatic cases of interventions 
upon everyday (purely) physical processes, 
(Not Both Direct and Precise) the actions which subjects engage in when they inter-
vene upon aspects of their own mental lives in cases of mental self-regulation are, in 
simple, paradigmatic cases, and indeed in the great majority of cases, either indirect or 
imprecise (or both), but they are usually not both direct and precise. 
Everyday (self-)observation suggests that this is a plausible claim, as we can see when 
considering the following list of illustrative examples: 
- putting on music to cheer oneself up: indirect;                  
- asking oneself where one has put one's keys, hoping that the question will bring up a 
memory: imprecise;                     
- engaging in breathing exercises to reduce a pain experience: indirect;               
- setting out to think more carefully about a particular matter: imprecise;              
- thinking about the option of going for a swim so as to dissipate a desire to watch TV: 
indirect; 
                                                      
9
 Thanks to Markus Schlosser for raising a problem with an earlier formulation of this distinction, and to 
Rory Madden for help with reformulating the distinction so as to avoid that problem. 
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Considering some examples from this list in a little more detail, we find that when a sub-
ject engages in breathing exercises to reduce a pain experience, the subject's intervention 
is indirect, because (at least usually) the subject's breathing is not a constitutive element 
of her pain experience, but the subject has reason to believe that an intervention on her 
breathing will in turn have an effect on her current pain experience. 
 When a subject sets out to think about a particular matter more carefully - for ex-
ample, when she asks herself why exactly she thinks that the death penalty should be 
abolished - the subject's intervention on her own mental life is imprecise, because she 
cannot predict or control in any suitably specific way what changes in her mental life will 
be brought about by setting out to think about the relevant matter; indeed, if she was able 
to predict and control relevant changes in a suitably specific way, she would not have to 
sit down to think about the matter, because her being able to predict relevant changes 
would entail that she already has a view on the matter, so it lies in the nature of setting 
out to think about something more carefully that one can only intervene on one's mental 
life in an imprecise manner in those situations. 
 More generally, the present set of exemplary cases makes it plausible that in very 
many cases in which a subject intervenes upon an aspect of her own mental life when en-
gaged in mental self-regulation, the action which the subject engages in is indirect; that 
is, the action which the subject engages in is not directed at that element of her own men-
tal life which she ultimately wants to intervene upon (and the action often is not even di-
rected at any element of her own mental life at all), but is rather directed at a feature of 
the situation other than the relevant element on which she would like to intervene; the 
feature at which the subject's action is directed is such that if the subject acts upon this 
feature in the appropriate way, the resulting changes will in turn bring about relevant 
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changes in that element of the subject's mental life which she ultimately wants to inter-
vene upon, and the subject understands this.  
 In many other cases in which a subject intervenes upon an aspect of her own men-
tal life when engaged in mental self-regulation, the action which the subject engages in is 
imprecise;
10
 while the action which the subject engages in might well be direct, the sub-
ject cannot predict, and cannot control, the outcome of her action in any suitably specific 
manner; indeed, in many cases in which a subject sets out to engage directly with the 
very element of her mental life which she wants to intervene upon, the subject tries to 
'prompt' relevant changes in her own mental life (e.g.: setting out to remember some-
thing, setting out to imagine something, or setting out to think something through); such 
'mental self-prompting' usually sets off some (sub-personal) psychological process that 
might eventually lead to (personal-level) changes in the subject's own mental life which 
are of the kind the subject was hoping for; but the workings of the relevant (sub-personal) 
process, that is, the 'mechanisms' involved, are usually opaque to the subject; and what 
the precise outcome of a relevant 'prompting' might possibly be usually is not only be-
yond the subject's control, but is also unknown to the subject at the time at which she en-
gages in the 'prompting' action; the subject's action itself therefore is a bit of a 'stab in the 
dark', and it is rather imprecise with respect to determining its outcome. 
 Thus, we have reason to hold that  
(Not Both Direct and Precise) the actions which subjects engage in when they inter-
vene upon aspects of their own mental lives in cases of mental self-regulation are, in 
simple, paradigmatic cases, and indeed in the great majority of cases, either indirect or 
imprecise (or both), but they are usually not both direct and precise.
11
 
                                                      
10
 The following train of thought is in some respects inspired by Strawson (2003), but I do not mean to take 
sides in the debate on mental action which Strawson himself is concerned with.  
11
 As the 'Not Both Direct and Precise' claim only speaks of 'the great majority of cases' it allows for excep-
tions. I consider a large class of such exceptional cases in the next section, but some cases might wrongly appear to be 
exceptions. For example, try to imagine a pink elephant; it is likely that you will find yourself with vivid visual imagery 
as of a pink elephant; but then, so an interlocutor suggests, the action which has led to your having this visual experi-
ence is both direct and precise. - In response, we should point out that there is a huge range of different kinds of mental 
 13 
 
VII Ð AN EXCEPTION: PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES  
Actions which subjects engage in when they intervene upon their own perceptual experi-
ences in cases of mental self-regulation present us with an important exception to the 'Not 
Both Direct and Precise' claim, because it seems that such actions often are both direct 
and precise. Some exemplary cases of relevant actions might be set out as follows: 
- closing one's eyes in the face of a gruesome scene on screen;                
- moving one's hand over the silky fabric to feel the smoothness of its surface;              
- coming to hold one's nose while walking across a field which has just been fertilized; 
Arguably, all of these exemplary actions are both direct and precise. For example, when a 
subject moves her hand to hold her nose to stop her olfactory experience of the freshly 
fertilized field, she knows exactly what is going to happen once her fingers have reached 
her nose - her olfactory experience of her environment will cease more or less completely 
- and this is exactly the change which she aims to bring about; thus, the relevant action 
should count as precise. It also seems plausible to accept that the delivery of sensory in-
formation via a subject's sense-organs is a constitutive part of relevant perceptual experi-
ences, so that a subject's action which is directed towards those aspects of one of her 
sense-organs which make the delivery of relevant sensory information possible should be 
understood as an action upon (a constitutive element of) the very perceptual experience 
itself; this in turn means that the subject's action of holding her nose should also count as 
direct. 
 Thus, we find that at least some of the actions which subjects engage in when they 
intervene upon their own perceptual experiences in cases of mental self-regulation pres-
                                                      
images that might arise when one instructs oneself to imagine a pink elephant; one might imagine a huge pink creature 
in the middle of the room, or a cute little pink drawing on a piece of paper, or one might have some vague visual ex-
perience as of an elephant in a zoo, painted pink all over. Thus, an intervention on one's own mental life which is based 
on the instruction to imagine a pink elephant should rather be classified as 'imprecise'. (Thanks to Richard Yetter-
Chappell and Alison Hills, who both independently suggested that the present case be considered here.)  
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ent us with an important exception to the 'Not Both Direct and Precise' claim. However, 
this in turn should not be very surprising. For perceptual experiences are those elements 
of our mental lives in which our mental lives are most closely and most directly 
'enmeshed' with the physical world around us; indeed, one might plausibly hold that per-
ceptual experiences are partly constituted by the physical world around us. But then, if a 
subject's perceptual experience is partly constituted by the physical world around her, 
then in an attempt to intervene upon her own perceptual experiences, the subject can sim-
ply intervene upon one of those constitutive parts of the experience which can be found 
in the physical world around her, which in turn means that we should expect that the ac-
tions which subjects engage in when they intervene upon their own perceptual experi-
ences in cases of mental self-regulation are often both direct and precise. 
 Now, when trying to name paradigm cases of mental events, one might quite 
easily come to think of perceptual experiences. However, with respect to mental self-
regulation, cases in which subjects regulate their own perceptual experiences are clearly 
exceptional cases, and they should most definitely not count as paradigmatic cases of 
mental self-regulation more generally. On the contrary, for the great majority of cases of 
mental self-regulation (such as the self-regulation of emotions, thoughts, beliefs, desires, 
intentions, memories, experiences of pleasure and pain, and imaginings), relevant actions 
are usually not both direct and precise. Thus, although the actions which subjects engage 
in when they intervene upon their own perceptual experiences might often be direct and 
precise, we can continue to endorse the 'Not Both Direct and Precise' Claim.  
 
VIII Ð AN ELUSIVE DOMAIN, AND A FRAGILE ABILITY  
Many philosophers hold that our own mental lives are what we are most intimately ac-
quainted with, and what we are aware of in some direct way, while our awareness of the 
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physical world around us is in important ways indirect. However, we now find that as far 
as our abilities to intervene in the relevant domains are concerned, things are structured in 
exactly the opposite way: While in simple, paradigmatic cases we can, and do, intervene 
upon events in the physical world by acting upon them in both direct and precise ways, 
the great majority of our interventions on our own mental lives are indirect or imprecise 
(or both). Thus, 
(Elusive Domain) our very own mental lives are a comparatively elusive domain in the 
face of our attempts at regulatory intervention when contrasted with the physical world. 
Furthermore, compared to interventions which are direct, interventions which are indirect 
entail more 'steps' on the way towards the goal which the subject aims to reach, the more 
steps there are the greater the chances are for things to go wrong and for the relevant at-
tempt to fail, and accordingly, interventions which are indirect are more prone to failure 
than interventions which are direct. 
 Similarly, compared to interventions which are precise, interventions which are 
imprecise entail much less control on the part of the intervening subject over the events 
that are prompted by the subject's intervening action, which in turn leaves more room for 
the subject's attempt at reaching the relevant goal to fail, and accordingly, interventions 
which are imprecise are more prone to failure than interventions which are precise. 
 We therefore have reason to hold that interventions which are indirect or impre-
cise (or both) are more prone to failure than interventions which are both direct and pre-
cise. Hence, 
(Fragile Ability) while our ability to regulate (purely) physical processes in our every-
day environments is rather robust, our ability to regulate our own mental lives is com-
paratively fragile.  
 However, an opponent might object to this claim as follows:12 
                                                      
12
 Thanks to Joseph Raz for raising the following set of issues. 
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(i) If the goal which a subject is trying to reach is imprecise, then the fact that the inter-
vention by which the subject aims to reach the relevant goal is imprecise does not make 
the relevant intervention more prone to failure than a precise intervention would have 
been.            
(ii) But then in cases of mental self-regulation, the goal which the subject is trying to 
reach often is imprecise.                
(iii) Thus, the fact that in cases of mental self-regulation relevant intervening actions of-
ten are imprecise does not entail that our ability to regulate our own mental lives is 
more fragile than our abilty to regulate (purely) physical processes.    
(iv) Thus, the Fragile Ability Claim is false. 
In response we should question the objection's premise (i): Consider an archer whose 
goal is for her arrow to hit any point on a large wall. This is an imprecise goal. Neverthe-
less, the archer is less prone to failure if her intervention on the situation entails a lot of 
control (i.e., if her intervention is precise), and she is more prone to failure if her inter-
vention on the situation entails hardly any control (i.e., if her intervention is imprecise). 
For example, assume that the archer has been blindfolded and has no idea which direction 
the wall is to be found in - in this case, while her goal is very imprecise, the archer has 
very little control over her action, and will be more prone to failure with respect to reach-
ing her imprecise goal than she would be if she was able to see the wall she wants to aim 
at, which would give her more control over her action.  
 Thus, even with an imprecise goal, compared to interventions which are precise, 
interventions which are imprecise leave more room for the subject's attempt at reaching 
the relevant goal to fail; accordingly, interventions which are imprecise are more prone to 
failure than interventions which are precise. Premise (i) of the opponent's objection is 
false, and we can continue to endorse the Fragile Ability Claim.
13
 
 
                                                      
13
 Do the Elusive Domain Claim and the Fragile Ability Claim delineate categorical differences or differ-
ences of degree? - If one holds that the physical and the mental realm are two categorically different realms of interven-
tion, interventions on one's mental life might well count as categorically different from interventions on one's physical 
environment. However, the differences delineated here are differences of degree: According to the Elusive Domain 
Claim our mental lives are a more elusive domain in the face of attempts at regulatory interventions when compared to 
the physical world, and according to the Fragile Ability Claim our ability to regulate our mental lives is more fragile 
than our ability to regulate physical processes. (Thanks to Mary Leng and Amanda Green who both (independently) 
raised the present question.) 
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IX Ð A QUERY, AND A RESPONSE  
However, so someone might doubtfully ask, aren't there cases in which our interventions 
on (purely) physical processes are also indirect or imprecise (or both)? If so, wouldn't this 
speak against the Elusive Domain Claim and the Fragile Ability Claim? 
 Our interlocutor might offer some exemplary cases in which interventions on 
(purely) physical processes could be described as either indirect or imprecise (or both), as 
follows:  
- moving the levers of a digger to bring it about that a hole is dug so that a house can be 
built: indirect;           
- baking bread: imprecise;                    
- oiling parts of a sewing machine in order for one's sewing to go more smoothly: indi-
rect;                       
- making high-energy particle beams collide (e.g. at CERN): imprecise;
14
 
It seems that each of the cases listed here might be plausibly described as either indirect 
or imprecise (or both). More generally, we might therefore grant that there are cases in 
which interventions on (purely) physical processes are either indirect or imprecise (or 
both). However, it seems that those cases (usually) present us with rather complex inter-
ventions on the physical world, and the fact that such complex interventions on the phys-
ical world might (sometimes) be plausibly described as either indirect or imprecise (or 
both) seems compatible with our earlier claim that in simple, paradigmatic cases we can, 
and do, regulate events in the physical world by acting upon them in both direct and pre-
cise ways.  
 Thus, even though there are cases in which subjects' interventions on (purely) 
physical processes are either indirect or imprecise, we can continue to endorse the Elu-
sive Domain Claim as well as the Fragile Ability Claim. 
 
                                                      
14
 Thanks to Clea Rees and Keith Allen who both (independently) suggested that examples of the present 
kind be considered here. 
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X Ð THE UNDERSTANDING CONDITION  
Next, we should consider the role which a subject's own understanding of her situation 
plays in her ability to regulate her own mental life. Quite generally, it seems plausible to 
hold that in order for a subject to be able to intervene in the unfolding of a certain process 
in a goal-directed way, it is necessary that the subject understand what some of the many 
different factors which jointly determine the unfolding of the relevant process are, how 
these factors contribute to the unfolding of the relevant process, and how she herself 
might interact with those factors in such a way as to make an intervention on the relevant 
process effective in reaching her regulatory goal. 
 For example, in order for a policewoman to be able to intervene in the flow of the 
traffic with the goal of making the traffic flow smoothly, it is necessary that the police-
woman understand what some of the many different factors which jointly determine the 
flow of the traffic are, how these factors contribute to the flow of the traffic, and how she 
herself might interact with those factors in such a way as to make an intervention on the 
flow of the traffic successful in reaching her regulatory goal of making the traffic flow 
smoothly.  
 Analogously, one might suggest that in order for a subject to be able to intervene 
in the unfolding of a certain aspect of her own mental life in a goal-directed way, it is ne-
cessary that the subject understand what some of the many different factors which jointly 
determine the unfolding of the relevant aspect of her own mental life are, how these fac-
tors contribute to the unfolding of the relevant aspect of her mental life, and how she her-
self might interact with those factors in such a way as to make an intervention on the rel-
evant aspect of her own mental life successful in reaching her regulatory goal. This, to-
gether with the Intervention-Condition, entails that 
(Understanding Condition) in order for a subject to regulate a certain aspect of her 
own mental life, it is necessary that the subject understand what some of the many dif-
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ferent factors which jointly determine the unfolding of the relevant aspect of her own 
mental life are, how these factors contribute to the unfolding of the relevant aspect of 
her own mental life, and how she herself might interact with those factors in such a way 
as to make an intervention on the relevant aspect of her own mental life successful in 
reaching her regulatory goal. 
The ways in which subjects who engage in mental self-regulation satisfy the Understand-
ing Condition in relevant situations in turn can, and do, vary along various different di-
mensions.  
 First, when subjects engage in mental self-regulation, their understanding of rel-
evant features of their situation is sometimes very rudimentary, and at other times it can 
be very sophisticated. For example, when a subject puts on some music in order to cheer 
herself up, it seems that the subject's attempt at mental self-regulation requires a rather 
sophisticated understanding of the link between emotional states and different types of 
music;
15
 it arguably also presupposes an understanding of person-specific conditions - the 
subject might understand that putting on the relevant kind of music will cheer her up, be-
cause she knows that she herself does like this kind of music (while she also knows that 
other people detest it). By contrast, when a subject tries to remember where she put her 
keys, it seems that the subject's understanding of the situation is rather rudimentary. A 
subject who tries to regulate her mental life by prompting herself with a question about 
her own past actions ('Where did I leave my keys?') hopes that this question will bring 
about the occurrence of a relevant memory; the subject's 'mental self-prompting' usually 
sets off some (sub-personal) psychological process that might eventually lead to (per-
sonal-level) changes in the subject's own mental life which are of the kind the subject was 
hoping for; but the workings of the relevant (sub-personal) process, that is, the 'mecha-
nisms' involved, are usually opaque to the subject; and what the precise outcome of a rel-
evant 'prompting' might possibly be usually is not only beyond the subject's control, but 
                                                      
15
 Our subject's understanding of the situation might, while sophisticated in some respects, still be limited in 
others - for example, she might not know why the relevant kind of music usually cheers her up. (Thanks to Alison Hills 
for raising this issue.) 
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is also unknown to the subject at the time at which she engages in the 'prompting' action; 
thus, the subject's understanding of the situation seems rather rudimentary.
16
 Indeed, it 
seems plausible to assume that in those cases in which a subject aims to regulate a certain 
aspect of her own mental life and the regulatory action on the part of the subject is impre-
cise, the fact that the action is imprecise (i.e., the fact that the subject is unable to predict 
and control the changes brought about by her action in a suitably specific way) is (at least 
in part) due to the fact that her understanding of the relevant situation is quite rudimen-
tary. 
 
XI Ð THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDING  
A second dimension along which the ways in which subjects satisfy the Understanding 
Condition can vary is this: 
(Theoretical or Practical Understanding) When subjects engage in mental self-regu-
lation, their understanding of relevant features of their situation is sometimes theoreti-
cal, but very often subjects' understanding of relevant features of their situation is prac-
tical. 
Cases in which a subject employs a theoretical understanding of the situation in order to 
regulate her own mental life are arguably rare, but do occur.  
 For example, consider Bob who has heard from a friend that breathing exercises 
of a certain kind are especially useful in regulating severe pain experiences; Bob has not 
had any pain experiences for a long time, so he has not tried this out yet. However, he 
now finds himself with a severe pain experience and puts his theoretical understanding of 
the situation to good use: Applying the theoretical understanding provided by his friend, 
he engages in the breathing exercises which his friend has told him about, and soon his 
pain experience is less severe.  
                                                      
16
 On related issues see also Eilan (1998) 187ff.. 
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 Thus, a subject's ability to regulate her own mental life sometimes can depend on 
the subject's having a theoretical understanding of relevant features of the situation. 
However, in many cases of mental self-regulation, a subject's ability to regulate her own 
mental life will not require any such theoretical understanding. Rather, in order for a sub-
ject to be able to regulate her own mental life, it is sufficient that the subject have a prac-
tical understanding of relevant features of the situation. In order for a subject to have such 
a practical understanding, it is in turn sufficient that the subject have relevant 'know-how' 
which entails a practical understanding of the situation. 
 
XII Ð PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDING, KNOW-HOW, AND SKILLS  
OF MENTAL SELF-REGULATION  
Indeed, I'd like to suggest that  
(Mental Know-How) all healthy human beings beyond the age of early childhood do 
have some 'mental self-regulatory know-how', that is, they have some knowledge of 
how to regulate their own mental lives.  
But then, what exactly does it mean to say that we all have some 'mental self-regulatory 
know-how'? 
 In answering this question we might begin by considering other, non-mental cases 
of regulatory know-how: Anna knows how to ride a bike - for example, she knows how 
to accelerate on a bike. Phil knows how to sail a dinghy - for example, he knows how to 
sail in a circle. Analogously, so it seems plausible to hold, Emma knows how to regulate 
her own mental life - for example, she knows how to bring it about that she imagines next 
week's job interview in detail and in a way that is conducive to her doing well in the 
interview. 
 Recent discussions of know-how have focused on cases of know-how concerning 
processes which are predominantly physical (e.g. riding a bike, or sailing a dinghy). 
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These discussions might be enriched by some more careful consideration of cases of 
know-how concerning processes which are predominantly mental (e.g. regulating one's 
imagination of a future event).  
 In the philosophical literature, there are two prominent recent accounts of know-
how: Following Stanley and Williamson (2001), some hold that know-how is ultimately a 
form of propositional knowledge; others follow Ryle (1990) and hold that know-how is 
knowledge 'of its own kind', not a mere automatism, but not propositional knowledge 
either; rather, so they say, know-how is sui generis knowledge. Luckily, we do not need 
to take sides in this debate here, because defenders of both views agree that 
(Know-How Entails Practical Understanding) a subject's know-how with respect to a 
certain domain entails a practical understanding of relevant situations; that is, a subject's 
domain-specific know-how entails a practical understanding of what some of the many 
different factors which jointly determine the unfolding of various domain-specific pro-
cesses are, how these factors contribute to the unfolding of relevant domain-specific 
processes, and how the subject herself might interact with those factors in such a way as 
to make interventions on the relevant processes successful in reaching particular goals. 
Thus, if Anna knows how to ride a bike, this know-how entails a practical understanding 
of what some of the many different factors which jointly determine her moving along on 
the bike are, how these factors contribute to the unfolding of the process of moving along 
on the bike, and how she herself might interact with those factors in such a way as to 
make effective interventions.  
 Next, we should clarify what it means to say that someone has 'practical under-
standing'. When we say of a subject that she has practical understanding, this seems to 
imply that the relevant understanding relies on various dispositions and abilities which it 
might not be possible to spell out in anything but demonstrative terms (e.g., 'this is how 
one should cycle down a muddy singletrack on a mountain bike'); in addition, someone 
who holds that know-how is sui generis knowledge might also say that practical under-
standing is a kind of non-propositional understanding. 
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 Applying our present considerations to the case of mental self-regulation, we find 
that we have reason to endorse the following claim: 
(Mental Know-How Entails Practical Understanding) A subject's mental self-regula-
tory know-how entails a practical understanding of relevant situations; that is, a sub-
ject's having some mental self-regulatory know-how entails the subject's having a prac-
tical understanding of what some of the many different factors which jointly determine 
the unfolding of relevant aspects of her own mental life are, how these factors contri-
bute to the unfolding of relevant aspects of her own mental life, and how she herself 
might interact with those factors in such a way as to make an intervention on relevant 
aspects of her own mental life successful in reaching her regulatory goals. 
Thus, if Emma knows how to regulate her emotions, this know-how entails a practical 
understanding of what some of the many different factors which jointly determine her 
emotional experiences are (e.g.: the impact of different kinds of music on her emotional 
states); how these factors contribute to the unfolding of emotional experiences (e.g.: 
cheerful music might alleviate a feeling of sadness); and how these factors might be ma-
nipulated in such a way as to make interventions on the unfolding of the relevant emotio-
nal experience successful in reaching a particular goal (e.g.: putting on some cheerful 
music might help in reaching the goal of making a feeling of sadness disappear). 
 Just as the skill of riding a bike can be more or less well developed, so the skill of 
mental self-regulation can also be more or less well developed. There are intra-personal 
as well as inter-personal differences with respect to the skill of mental self-regulation: A 
subject might gain more mental self-regulatory know-how over time and thus come to 
know how to regulate her own mental life better, and some people have greater mental 
self-regulatory know-how than others. We might explain these differences as differences 
in sensitivity - that is, we might hold that with respect to the case of mental self-regu-
lation just as with other cases of skill, 'the elements which constitute [the] skill, as they 
become more and more refined, become more and more sensitive to context' (Fridland 
2014: 83). As  with other skills, it seems plausible to assume that subjects can cultivate 
and further develop their skills of mental self-regulation. More generally, we have reason 
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to hold that our ability to shape our own mental lives often importantly depends on our 
having relevant skills of mental self-regulation. 
 
XIII Ð CONCLUSION  
The suggestion that we can 'shape our own mental lives' and that healthy, mature human 
beings are able to play an active part in how their own mental lives develop might at first 
sight seem surprising. However, as we have meanwhile seen, subjects can, and often do, 
engage in mental self-regulation, that is, they can be, and often are, actively involved 
with their own mental lives in a goal-directed way. In an attempt to understand this 
ability better, we have addressed the question as to how mental self-regulation is possible 
and have determined some 'enabling conditions' of mental self-regulation; we have found 
that 
in order for a subject to regulate a certain aspect of her own mental life, it is necessary    
- (Guidance Condition) that the subject be able to guide how the relevant aspect of her 
own mental life develops, and that she be able to do so in a goal-directed way;               
- (Intervention Condition) that the subject be able to intervene, in a goal-directed way, 
in the unfolding of the relevant aspect of her own mental life;                
- (Effective Agency Condition) that the subject be able to act with respect to the rel-
evant mental event (or process, or state of affairs), and that she be able to act in a way 
which is effective, that is, in a way which brings about a change in the targeted event, a 
change which would not have occurred otherwise;             
- (Understanding Condition) that the subject understand what some of the many dif-
ferent factors which jointly determine the unfolding of the relevant aspect of her own 
mental life are, how these factors contribute to the unfolding of the relevant aspect of 
her own mental life, and how she herself might interact with those factors in such a way 
as to make an intervention on the relevant aspect of her own mental life successful in 
reaching her regulatory goal. 
These conditions in turn should further our understanding of the phenomenon of mental 
self-regulation.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, in contemporary Philosophy of Mind our ability to shape 
our own mental lives by means of mental self-regulation has been rather neglected. I 
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hope that the present paper has shown that the phenomenon deserves our careful atten-
tion, and that an understanding of the phenomenon of mental self-regulation is crucial for 
any attempt at gaining a full understanding of the nature of the human mind. What is 
more, as we said earlier, if we are able to shape our mental lives by means of mental self-
regulation we might also be able to shape our mental lives for the better, or for the worse. 
Our ability to shape our own mental lives by means of mental self-regulation should 
therefore also have axiological implications which deserve closer attention. Indeed, the 
observation that we are able to engage in mental self-regulation gives us good reason to 
explore issues in an area of research which we might call 'the ethics of mental life', an 
area of research which I think should provide great opportunities for innovative and 
worthwhile philosophical work in future.
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